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Abstract
This paper examines the integration of computational
complexity into game theoretic models. The example
focused on is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, repeated for a
finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound
on the players’ computational ability is sufficient to
enable cooperative behavior.
In addition, a variant of the repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game is suggested, in which players have the
choice of opting out. This modification enriches the
game and suggests dominance of cooperative strate-
gies.
Competitive analysis is suggested as a tool for inves-
tigating sub-optimal (but computationally tractable)
strategies and game theoretic models in general. Us-
ing competitive analysis, it is shown that for bounded
players, a sub-optimal strategy might be the optimal
choice, given resource limitations.
Keywords: Conceptual and theoretical foundations
of multiagent systems; Prisoner’s Dilemma
Introduction
Alice and Bob have been arrested as suspects for mur-
der, and are interrogated in separate rooms. If they
both admit to the crime, they get 15 years of impris-
onment. If both do not admit to the crime, they can
only be convicted for a lesser crime, and get 3 years
each. However, if one of them admits and the other
does not, the defector becomes a state’s witness and is
released, while the other serves 20 years.
This is a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (PD) game, a
type of interaction that has been widely studied in Po-
litical Science, the Social Sciences, Philosophy, Biology,
Computer Science, and of course in Game Theory. The
feature of PD that makes it so interesting is that it is
analogous to many situations of interaction between
autonomous parties. The PD game models most situ-
ations in which both parties can benefit from playing
cooperatively, but each party can get a higher gain
from not cooperating when the opponent does. See
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma game matrix
As an example, consider two software agents, A and
B, sent by their masters onto the Internet to find as
many articles about PD as they can. The agents meet,
and identify that they have a common goal. Each agent
can benefit from receiving information from the other,
but sending information has a cost. The agents agree
to send packets of information to each other simulta-
neously. Assume that sending an empty packet costs
$1, sending a useful packet costs $2, and receiving a
useful packet is worth $3. This interaction is precisely
a PD game with S = −2, P = −1, R = 1 and T = 2.
Under the assumption of rationality, the PD game
has only one equilibrium: both players defect. This
result is valid even for any finite sequence of games—
both players can deduce that the opponent will de-
fect in the last round, therefore they cannot be “pun-
ished” for defecting in the one-before-last round, and
by backward induction it becomes common knowledge
that both players will defect in every round of the re-
peated game.
The “always defect” equilibrium of PD is in a sense
paradoxical; it contradicts some of our basic intuitions
about intelligent behavior, and stands in contrast to
psychological evidence (Rapoport et al. 1962). The
root of this paradox is the assumption of rationality,
which implies unlimited computational power; it is pre-
cisely the unlimited computational power of rational
agents that both allows and requires them to perform
the unlimited backward induction in the repeated PD.
In reality, both natural and artificial agents have lim-
ited resources. In this paper we show that once these
limitations are incorporated into the interaction, coop-
erative behavior becomes possible and reasonable.
The idea of bounding agents’ rationality is not new.
The novelty of the approach presented here is in its
straightforwardness. The bound on rationality is mea-
sured in the most standard scale of Computer Science:
computation time. We assume that agents need time
for computations, and that the game is repeated for
a finite length of time, rather then a fixed number of
iterations. These assumptions are sufficient to create
cooperative equilibria.
These results are interesting from two points of view,
the system (or environment) designer’s perspective,
and the agent designer’s perspective. From the sys-
tem designer’s point of view, it gives guidelines as to
how to create a cooperation-encouraging environment.
From the agent designer’s point of view, it enables him
to design a strategy that will impose cooperation on his
agent’s opponent.
Related Work
A thorough and comprehensive survey of the basic lit-
erature on bounded rationality and repeated PD ap-
pears in (Kalai 1990). Axelrod (Axelrod & Hamilton
1981; Axelrod 1984) reports on his famous computer
tournament and analyzes social systems accordingly.
Most of the work on this subject has centered
on various automata as models of bounded ratio-
nality; (Papadimitriou 1992; Gilboa & Samet 1989;
Fortnow & Whang 1994) and others (see (Kalai 1990)
for an extensive bibliography) deal with finite state au-
tomata with a limited number of states, and (Megiddo
& Wigderson 1986) examines Turing machines with a
bounded number of states. The main drawback of the
automata approach is that cooperative behavior is usu-
ally achieved by “exhausting” the machine—designing
a game pattern that is so complex that the machine has
to use all its computational power to follow it. Such
a pattern is highly non-robust and will collapse in the
presence of noise.
Papadimitriou, in (Papadimitriou 1992), analyzes a
3-player variant of the PD game. This game is played
in two stages: first, every player chooses a partner,
then if two players choose each other, they play PD.
Two sections of this paper deal with a similar variation
on the repeated PD game, in which players have the
possibility of opting out.
Several researchers (see (Nowak & Sigmund 1993;
Binmore & Samuelson 1994) for examples and fur-
ther bibliography) took Axelrod’s lead and investi-
gated evolutionary models of games. Most, if not all,
of these works studied populations of deterministic or
stochastic automata with a small number of states.
The reason for limiting the class of computational mod-
els investigated was mainly pragmatic: the researchers
had limited resources of computer space and time at
their disposal. We hope that this paper might give a
sounder motivation for the focus on “simple” or “fast”
strategies. We claim that the same limitations that
hold for researchers hold for any decision maker, and
should be treated as an inherent aspect of the domain.
The task of finding papers on the Internet, as pre-
sented in the example above, can be seen as a dis-
tributed search problem. The power of cooperation in
such problems has been studied in (Hogg & Huber-
mann 1993).
Other examples of domains for which work of the
type presented here is relevant can be found in (Fikes
et al. 1995) and in (Foner 1995). Foner’s system ex-
plicitly relies on autonomous agents’ cooperation. He
describes a scenario in which agents post ads on a net-
work, advertising their wish to buy or sell some item.
Ads (or, in fact, the agents behind them) find partners
by communicating with other agents, and sharing with
them information on ad-location acquired in previous
encounters. As Foner himself states:
Such behavior is altruistic, in that any given agent
has little incentive to remember prior ads, though
if there is uniformity in the programming of each
agent, the community as a whole will benefit, and
so will each individual agent.
Game theory predicts that such behavior will not pre-
vail. The results presented in this paper suggest that
the computational incompetence of the agents can be
utilized to make sure that it does.
Outline of the Paper
The section “Finite Time Repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma” presents and examines the finite time re-
peated PD game. The main result of this section is
in Theorem 4, which shows weak conditions for the
existence of a cooperative equilibrium.
The following section introduces the possibility of
opting out, parting from an unsuitable partner. In that
section we mainly develop tools for dealing with opting
out, and show conditions under which opting out is a
rational choice.
In the section “Sub-Optimal Strategies” we use com-
petitive analysis to show that, in a sense, opting out
strengthens the cooperative players. Without it, a non-
cooperative player can force his opponent into non-
cooperative behavior. The possibility of opting out
changes the balance of forces, allowing a cooperative
player to force an opponent into cooperative behavior.
Finite Time Repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma
In this section we deal with a game of PD that is
repeated for a finite time (which we call the FTPD
game). Previous work (Kalai 1990) focused on finite
or infinite iterated PD (IPD). The basic idea is that
two players play PD for N rounds. In each round,
once both have made their move (effectively simulta-
neously), they get the payoffs defined by the PD game
matrix. In our version of the game, the players play
PD for a fixed amount of (discrete) time. At each tick
of the clock, if both made a move, they get the PD pay-
off. However, if either player did not make his move
yet, nothing happens (both players get 0). See Fig-
ure 2. Readers who are familiar with the game theo-
retic literature on PD, might notice a problem that this
perturbation entails. If H = 0, it creates a new equi-
librium point, thus technically eliminating the paradox
(this is, in fact, why the payoff when both players wait
is labeled H and not defined as 0). However, this is
a technical problem, and can be overcome by techni-
cal means, for instance by setting P = 0 or H = −ǫ.
See (Mor 1995) for further discussion.
A
B
D C W
D P
P
T
S 0
C S
T
R
R 0
W 0 0 H
H ≤ 0
Figure 2: FTPD Game Payoff Matrix
Rules of the FTPD Game:
• 2 players play PD repeatedly for N clock ticks, N
given as input to players.
• At each round, players can choose C (cooperate),
or D (defect). If they choose neither, W (wait) is
chosen for them by default.
• The payoff for each player is his total payoff over N
rounds (clock ticks).
Theorem 1 If all players are (unboundedly) rational,
and P > 0 > H, the FTPD game is reduced to the
standard IPD game.
Proof. The W row (column) is dominated by the D
row (column), and thus can be eliminated.
We now proceed to define our notion of bounded
rationality, and examine its influence on the game’s
outcome. Theorem 2 is presented to enable the reader
to compare our approach to the more standard one of
automata models.
Definition 1 A Complexity Bounded
(CB) player is one with the following bound on ra-
tionality: each “compare” action takes the player (at
least) one clock tick.1
Unless mentioned otherwise, we will assume this is
the only bound on players’ rationality, and that each
“compare” requires exactly one clock tick.
Theorem 2 The complexity bound on rationality is
weaker than restricting players to Turing Machines.
That is to say, any strategy realizable by a Turing Ma-
chine can be played by CB players.
Proof. Assuming that every read/write a Turing Ma-
chine performs takes one clock tick, a Turing Machine
is by definition complexity bounded.
From now on we will deal only with complexity
bounded players. Furthermore, we must limit either
design time or memory to be finite (or enumerable).2
Otherwise, our bound on rationality becomes void: a
player can “write down” strategies for any N before-
hand, and “jump” to the suitable one as soon as it
receives N .
The main objective of this section is to show how the
complexity bound on rationality leads to the possibil-
ity of cooperative behavior. To do this, we must first
define the concepts of equilibrium and cooperativeness.
Definition 2 A Nash equilibrium in an n-player
game is a set of strategies, Σ = {σ1, ..σn}, such that,
given that for all i player i plays σi, no player j can
get a higher payoff by playing a strategy other then σj .
Definition 3 A Cooperative Equilibrium is a pair
of strategies in Nash equilibrium, such that, when
played one against the other, they will result in a payoff
of R ∗N to both players.
1Formally, we have to say explicitly what we mean by a
“compare”. The key idea is that any computational process
takes time for the player. Technically, we will say that a
CB player can perform at most k binary XORs in one clock
tick, and k < log
2
N .
2Papadimitriou (Papadimitriou 1992) makes a distinc-
tion between design complexity and decision complexity.
In our model, decision complexity forces a player to play
W, while design complexity is not yet handled. The choice
of strategy is made at design time; switching from Sa to Sb
at decision time can be phrased as a strategy Sc: “play Sa,
if. . . switch to Sb”.
Definition 4 A Cooperative Strategy is one that
participates in a cooperative equilibrium.
Theorem 3 A cooperative player will Wait or Defect
only if his opponent Defected or Waited at an earlier
stage of the game.
Proof. If the player is playing against its counterpart
in the cooperative equilibrium and it Waits, its payoff
is no more then (N − 1) ∗ R, in contradiction to the
definition of cooperative equilibrium.
For any other player, as long as the opponent plays
C, the cooperative player cannot distinguish it from
its equilibrium counterpart.
Theorem 4 is the main result of this section.
Theorem 4 If R > 0, then there exists a cooperative
equilibrium of the FTPD game.
Proof. Consider the strategy GRIM:
1. Begin by playing C, continue doing so as long as the
opponent does.
2. If the opponent plays anything other then C, switch
to playing D for the remainder of the game.3
Note that GRIM requires one “compare” per round,
so having it played by both players results in N rounds
played, and a payoff of N ∗R for each player.
Assume that both players decide to play GRIM. We
have to show that no player can gain by changing his
strategy.
If player A playsD in round k, k < N , then player B
plays D from that round on. A can gain from playing
D if and only if he plays D in the Nth round only. In
order to do so, he has to be able to count to N . Since
N is given as input at the beginning of the game, A
can’t design a strategy that plays GRIM N − 1 rounds
and then plays D. He must compare some counter
to N − 2 before he defects, to make sure he gains by
defection. Doing so, he causes B to switch to playing
D. Therefore, his maximal payoff is:
(N − 1) ∗R+ (P −R)
A will change his strategy if and only if P − 2R > 0.
We assumed that R > P . If R > 0, then 2R > R, and
A will not switch. Else, by assumption, 2R > T + S,
so A will switch only if P > T +S, and will not switch
if T − P > −S.
3The strategy GRIM assumes a player can react to a
Wait or Defect in the next round, i.e., without waiting him-
self. This can be done, for example, if the strategy is stated
as an “if” statement: “If opponent played C, play C, else,
play D.” This strategy requires one “compare” per round.
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Figure 3: OPD Game Matrix
Finite Time Repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma with Opting Out
In this section we study a variant of the FTPD game,
which we call OPD, in which players have the option
of Opting Out—initiating a change of opponent (see
Figure 3). A similar idea appears in (Papadimitriou
1992). While in the previous section we only altered
the nature of the players and the concept of iteration,
here we change the rules of the game. This requires
some justification.
The motivation for OPD is that it allows players
greater flexibility in choosing strategies. Consider
player A whose opponent plays GRIM. In IPD or
FTPD, once A defects, the opponent will defect for-
ever after. From this point on, the only rational strat-
egy for A is also to defect until the end of the game.
The possibility of opting out enables A to return to
a cooperative equilibrium. Generally, the existence of
“vengeful strategies” (like GRIM) is problematic in the
standard game context. Other researchers (Gilboa &
Samet 1989; Fortnow & Whang 1994) have dealt with
these strategies by explicitly removing them from the
set of strategies under consideration. Once opting out
is introduced, this is no longer necessary.
The possibility of opting out also makes the game
less vulnerable to noise, and provides fertile ground
for studying learning in the PD game context. These
issues are beyond the scope of the current paper;
see (Mor 1995) for further discussion.
One last motivation for this line of work is soci-
ological: “breaking up a relationship” is a common
way of punishing defectors in repeated human inter-
actions. Vanberg and Congleton, in (Vanberg & Con-
gleton 1992), claim that opting out (“Exit” in their
terminology) is the moral choice, and show that Opt-
for-Tat is more successful than Tit-for-Tat in Axelrod-
type tournaments (Axelrod 1984).
We start by comparing the OPD game to traditional
approaches, namely to games played by rational play-
ers and to the IPD game.
Theorem 5 If all players are (unboundedly) rational,
and P ≥ Q ≥ 0 (and Qˆ < 0, H < 0), the OPD game
is reduced to the standard IPD game.
Proof. The W row (column) is dominated by the D
row (column), and thus can be eliminated.
Playing O will result in a payoff of Q, Q < P , and
a switch in partner. Since all players are rational, this
is equivalent to remaining with the same partner. A
player cannot get a higher payoff by playing O, hence
the O row and column are eliminated.
Theorem 6 In the IPD game with opting out, if P >
Q > Qˆ and H < 0, then the only Nash equilibrium is
< DN , DN >.
Proof. The standard reasoning of backward induction
works in this game; see (Mor 1995) for the full proof.
From now on we will deal only with the OPD game.
For simplicity’s sake, we will assume Q = 0, and Qˆ =
H = −ǫ.
Let us define the full context of the game.
Rules of the OPD Game:
1. A population of 2K players is divided into pairs.
2. For every pair of players < i, j >, every clock tick,
each player outputs an action α, α ∈ {C,D,O}. If
he does not output any of these, W is assigned by
default.
3. If either outputs O, the pair is split and both get Q,
regardless of the other player’s action. Otherwise, if
both play C or D, they get the PD payoff, and con-
tinue playing with one another. In any other case,
both get 0 and remain paired.
4. Both players can observe their payoff for the previous
round. We assume both do, and therefore ignore this
monitoring action in our computations, i.e., assume
this is done in 0 time.
5. Every t clock ticks, all unpaired players are randomly
matched.
6. The payoff to a player is the sum of payoffs he gets
over N clock ticks.
We can now make a qualitative statement: opting
out can be a rational response to a defection. This is
the intuition behind Theorem 7. In the next section
we will attempt to quantify this claim.
Theorem 7 The expected payoff when playing against
a cooperative opponent is higher than when playing
against an unknown one.
Proof. (Sketch - See (Mor 1995) for a more detailed
proof.) Whatever A’s move is for the first round, his
payoff against a cooperative opponent is at least as
high as against an unknown one. If he plays anything
other then C, his opponent becomes unknown, and
the proof is complete. If he plays C, we continue by
induction.
Theorem 8 If there is a positive probability of at least
one of the other players being cooperative, and re-
matching is instantaneous, then a player in the OPD
game has a positive expected gain from opting out
whenever the opponent waits.4
Proof. This theorem follows directly from Theorem 3
and Theorem 7. The full proof can be found in (Mor
1995).
Sub-Optimal Strategies
In considering whether to opt out or not, player A
has to assess his expected payoff against his current
opponent B, the probability B will opt out given A’s
actions, and his expected payoff after opting out. Such
calculations require extensive computational resources,
and thus carry a high cost for a CB player. Fur-
thermore, they require vast amounts of prior knowl-
edge about the different players in the population. Al-
though complete information is a standard assumption
in many game theoretic paradigms, it is infeasible in
most realistic applications to form a complete proba-
bilistic description of the domain.
As an alternative to the optimizing approach, we
examine satisfying strategies.5 Instead of maximizing
their expected payoff, satisfying players maximize their
worst case payoff. The intuition behind this is, that
if maximizing expected payoff is too expensive com-
putationally, the next best thing to do is to ensure
the highest possible “security level,” protecting oneself
best against the worst (max-min).
4The problematic condition is instantaneous rematch-
ing. There are 2 necessary and sufficient conditions for this
to happen:
1. Opting out can be done in the same round the opponent
waits.
2. If a player opted out in this round, he will be playing
against a (possibly new) opponent in the next round,
i.e., there is no “transition time” from one opponent to
another.
The second condition is unjustifiable in any realistic setting.
The first condition returns to a player’s ability to “watch
the opponent” without waiting, mentioned in Footnote 3.
In (Mor 1995) we show different assumptions that make
this condition possible.
5Herbert Simon (Simon 1969; 1983) coined the term
“Satisficing” as an alternative to “Maximizing.” Although
our approach is close in spirit to his, it differs in its formal-
ism. Therefore we prefer to use a slightly different term.
In order to evaluate satisfying strategies, we use the
method of competitive analysis. Kaniel (Kaniel 1994)
names Sleator and Tarjan (Sleator & Tarjan 1984) as
the initiators of this approach. The idea is to use the
ratio between the satisfying strategy’s payoff and that
of a maximizing strategy as a quantifier of the satisfy-
ing strategy’s performance.
We begin by defining the concepts introduced above.
Definition 5 The Security Level of a strategy S is
the lowest payoff a player playing S might get. For-
mally, if Γ is the set of all possible populations of play-
ers, and µ(S) is the expected payoff of S then the se-
curity level SL(S) is:
minγ∈Γ {µ| the population is γ}
Definition 6
• A Maximizing player is one that plays in a way
that maximizes his expected payoff.
• A Satisfying player is one that plays in such a way
that maximizes his security level.
Definition 7 Let A be a satisfying player, and let S
be A’s strategy. Let h(S) be the expected payoff of A,
had he been a maximizing player. The Competitive
ratio of S is:
CR(S) =
SL(S)
h(S)
.
The following two theorems attempt to justify exam-
ination of satisfying rather than maximizing strategies.
Theorem 9 If there is a probability of at least q > 0
of being matched with a cooperative player at any stage
of the game, then a player in the OPD game can ensure
himself a security level of N ∗R− const.
Proof. Consider the strategy Opt-for-Tat (OFT).
This is the strategy of opting out whenever the op-
ponent does not cooperate and cooperating otherwise.
The expected number of times a player A playing OFT
will opt out is 1
q
, after which he will be matched with
a cooperative player, and receive R for each remaining
round of the game.
Actually, it is easy to show that const = 1
q
∗ [(r +
1)R − S] where r is the expected number of rounds a
player has to wait for a rematch (Mor 1995).
Theorem 10 If there is a probability of at least q >
0 of being matched with a cooperative player, and all
players in the population are satisfying or optimizing
players, a player in the OPD game cannot receive a
payoff higher then N ∗R+ const.
Proof. Assume there exists a strategy θ that offers a
player A playing it a payoff greater then N ∗ (R + β),
β > 0. This means that in some rounds A defects
and receives T . However, as soon as A defects, he
identifies himself as a θ player. His opponent can infer
that playing against A he will receive a payoff lower
then the security level N ∗R− const, and will opt out.
Let r be the expected number of rounds a player waits
for a rematch. If (r + 1) ∗ R < T then A loses every
time he defects, and will get a payoff < N ∗R. If (r +
1)∗R > T then “defect always” is the only equilibrium
strategy, and the probability of being rematched with
a cooperative player becomes 0 (in contradiction to our
assumption).
From Theorems 9 and 10 we get that as N and q
grow, the competitive ratio of a satisfying strategy in
this game approaches 1. If the time needed to com-
pute the optimizing strategy is proportional to N , a
satisfying strategy is de facto optimal for a CB player.
Related work revisited
The possibility of opting out makes cooperative, non-
vengeful strategies even stronger. This tool can be
further developed into a strategy-designing tool (Mor
1995). We wish to demonstrate this claim using the
examples presented in the introduction of this paper.
In domains like the paper-searching agents or Foner’s
ad-agents, cooperative information sharing is a desir-
able, if not required, behavior. We propose the follow-
ing guidelines for designers of such an environment:
• Ensure a large enough initial proportion of cooper-
ative agents in the domain (e.g., by placing them
there as part of the system). Make the existence of
these agents known to the users of the system.
• Advise the users to use the following protocol in in-
formational transactions:
– Split the information being transferred to small
packets.
– Use an OFT strategy, i.e., keep on sending packets
as long as the opponent does, break up and search
for a new opponent as soon as a packet does not
arrive in time.
• Inform the users of the satisfying properties of this
strategy.
As shown in the section “Sub-Optimal Strategies,” it
is reasonable to assume that a large proportion of the
users will implement cooperative strategies in their
agents.
Conclusions
We introduced the finite time repeated PD game, and
the notion of complexity bounded players. In doing so,
we encapsulated both the player’s utility and his in-
ductive power into one parameter: his payoff in the
game. Cooperative equilibria arise as an almost in-
herent characteristic of this model, as can be seen in
Theorem 4. Furthermore, the common knowledge of
limited computational power enables an agent to con-
trol his opponent’s strategy. If the opponent spends
too much time on computations, he is probably plan-
ning to defect.
In the sections that followed, we introduced and
studied opting out in the PD game. We discussed
both theoretical and intuitive motivations for this vari-
ation on the standard game description. In the sec-
tion “Sub-Optimal Strategies,” we used the tool of
competitive analysis to show that the possibility of
opting out makes cooperative, non-vengeful strategies
even stronger. We then demonstrated the usefulness of
these results with relation to the examples presented
in the introduction.
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